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LIBERTARIANISM AND AVOIDABILITY: 
A REPLY TO WIDERKER 
John Martin Fischer 
In previous work, I have claimed that the Frankfurt-style counterexamples to 
the Principle of Alternative Possibilities work even in a world in which the 
actual sequence proceeds in a manner congenial to the libertarian. In "Lib-
ertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions," Widerker criticizes this 
claim. Here I cast some doubt upon the criticism. Widerker's critique depends 
on the falsity of a view held by Molina (and others) about the possibility of 
non-deterministic grounds for "would-conditionals." Apart from this point, 
there are plausible versions of libertarianism which avoid the thrust of 
Widerker's criticism. 
I have claimed that an agent might be morally responsible for a decision even 
though he could not have made a different decision. Further, I have suggested 
that even a libertarian could accept this point. That is, I have suggested that 
one could require that the actual sequence that issues in the decision not be 
causally deterministic, and nevertheless say that there are certain conceivable 
circumstances in which an agent is morally responsible for a decision even 
though he could not have made a different decision. l 
In "Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions," David 
Widerker rejects my suggestion.2 Widerker begins by laying out the Frank-
furt-type example (of Jones and Black) on the basis of which I claimed that 
a certain sort of libertarian could reject the alternative-possibilities require-
ment for moral responsibility for decisions. In this example, Jones decides to 
vote for Reagan on his own, without any weird intervention; it seems to me 
that Jones can legitimately be held morally responsible for his decision, 
although he cannot have decided to vote for Carter (in virtue of the existence 
of the "counterfactual intervener," Black). It appeared to me that nothing in 
the formulation-explicit or implicit-of the case requires that causal deter-
minism obtains (or that the "actual sequence issuing in the decision and action 
... proceed in a deterministic way"), and thus I claimed that even a libertarian 
could accept the claim I derived from it. 
Widerker argues that, contrary to my supposition, the case does indeed 
implicitly presuppose causal determinism. To see why, consider more care-
fully how it is supposed to work. Let us say that prior to the time T +i of the 
decision, Jones would be in either a state which Black could "read" as an 
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inclination to decide to vote for Reagan at T +i, or a state which Black could 
"read" as an inclination to decide to vote for Carter at T +i. That is, at T Jones 
would either show a sign that he would in fact decide to vote for Reagan or 
that he would in fact decide to vote for Carter at T +i. If Black sees the sign 
at T of Jones' deciding to vote for Reagan at T +i, he does nothing, simply 
monitoring the situation; but if Black sees the sign at T of Jones' deciding to 
vote for Carter at T+i, he intervenes to ensure that Jones votes for Reagan.3 
Now the thrust of Widerker's criticism can be presented. If the sign at T is 
not in fact causally sufficient for (say) the decision to vote for Re"agan at T +i, 
then Black is not in a position to prevent Jones from deciding to vote for 
Carter. For suppose Jones manifests the sign at T that he will decide to vote 
for Reagan at T +i. Still, insofar as this sign is not causally sufficient for Jones' 
deciding to vote for Reagan at T +i, Jones may indeed decide to vote for Carter 
at T +i despite having shown the prior sign of voting for Reagan. Thus, even 
if Jones does in fact decide to vote for Reagan on his own at T +i, this would 
not be a case in which all of the following would be true: the actual sequence 
issuing in the decision is not causally deterministic, Jones is morally respon-
sible for his decision, and he couldn't have decided otherwise. After all, given 
the lack of causal sufficiency of the prior sign, he could have decided to vote 
for Carter, despite having shown the sign of voting for Reagan. And if the 
prior sign is envisaged as causally sufficient, then Black is in a position to 
prevent Jones from making another decision; but now apparently the actual 
sequence issuing in the decision is causally deterministic. 
Widerker's criticism is very insightful, and it deserves more careful atten-
tion than I can give it here. But I shall here make two observations. First, I 
claim that Widerker's criticism appears simply to presuppose (without argu-
mentation) that Molinism is false. Second, I shall suggest that there are 
certain libertarian approaches whose adherents can indeed say that an agent 
may be morally responsible for a decision even though he could not have 
made a different decision. 
Of course, I cannot here layout or seek to defend the views of Molina 
pertaining to free wil1.4 I do not have confidence that Molina is correct, but 
then again I am not certain that he is wrong. On Molina's view, it may be 
that even though the prior sign at T that Jones will decide to vote for Reagan 
at T +i is causally insufficient for Jones' deciding to vote for Reagan at T +i, 
nevertheless there can be "noncausal facts"-perhaps facts about Jones' val-
ues, character, configuration of motivational states, and so forth-by refer-
ence to which one could in principle know in advance that Jones will decide 
to vote for Reagan at T +i. Thus, on this sort of view, the facts by virtue of 
which the example works need not be causal facts. (Others besides Molina 
would hold this kind of view, and other views of Molina are not entailed by 
this position; "Molinism" is just a convenient term for the specific view under 
consideration here.) 
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To see how the Molinist reply to Widerker's criticism would go, consider 
the conditional, discussed by Widerker, 
(5) If Jones shows an inclination at T to decide to vote for Reagan at T +i, 
then Jones will decide to vote for Reagan at T +i. 
The Molinist claims that this conditional can be rendered true by "noncausal 
facts" or at least facts which fall short of implying that the prior inclination 
is causally sufficient for the subsequent decision. If this (admittedly conten-
tious) Molinist clam is correct and given that Jones does in fact show the 
inclination at T, then if Jones is able at T +i to decide to vote for Carter, he 
must be able so to act that the past would have been different from the way 
it actually was. This is because Jones' making the decision to vote for Carter 
at T +i would require that Jones not have shown the inclination at T to decide 
to vote for Reagan at T +i. But since the libertarian accepts the fixity of the 
past, he will deny that Jones is able at T +i to make a different decision from 
what he actually makes. 
Now I wish to emphasize that I recognize that the Molinist view presented 
very briefly above is highly controversial. All I claim here is that Widerker's 
criticism of my suggestion presupposes its falsity. Incidentally, I am puzzled 
by some of Widerker's remarks about (5). He points out that the following is 
an "interpretation" of (5): 
(5b) If Jones shows an inclination at T to decide to vote for Reagan, then 
Jones will freely decide at T + i to vote for Reagan. 
Widerker then points out that on the basis of this sort of interpretation of (5), 
the libertarian "may again claim that in the actual situation, when Jones shows 
an inclination to decide to vote for Reagan, he has it within his power not to 
decide to vote for Reagan.,,5 But part of what is at issue here is whether an agent 
can "act freely" or "decide freely" without being free to do (or decide) otherwise; 
thus, one cannot in this context simply assume that Jones' freely deciding to vote 
for Reagan implies that he is free to make a different decision. 
Also, Widerker says: 
Note that in case a libertarian construes (5) in terms of (5b), Black can, if he 
knows (5b), ensure that Jones will decide to vote for Reagan by inserting the 
mechanism in Jones's brain. However, if he acts in this way, he does not 
deprive Jones of his freedom to decide otherwise. He does not do this any 
more than someone knowing that if he asks me what time it is, then r will 
freely tell him the time, can, by asking me this question, deprive me of my 
power not to answer his question.6 
But the Jones/Black case is very different from Widerker's "time-telling" 
case. Let us suppose that someone asks Widerker at T what time it is. Suppose 
further that Widerker shows some sign at T +m if he is inclined to obey the 
instructions and respond at T +n. There is no special reason however to sup-
pose that there are any facts which render it true that if Widerker were to 
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show this sign at T +m, then he would (rather than probably would) respond 
at T +n. Further, there is no reason to suppose that if Widerker were to exhibit 
an inclination at T +m not to respond at T +n, then someone (or something) 
would intervene to ensure that he so respond at T +n. Thus, in contrast to the 
Jones/Black case, there is no reason to say that Widerker lacks the freedom 
not to say what time it is. 
Thus, if Molinism is correct, there are forms of libertarianism in which the 
relationship between the agent's decision and what precedes it is not causally 
deterministic according to which an agent may be morally responsible for 
making a decision even though he could not have made a different decision. 
Now I wish to proceed to my second observation about Widerker's critique. 
That is, I wish to develop (in an extremely sketchy way) another sort of 
libertarianism; on this kind of approach, the relationship between the relevant 
"sign" or "signal" and the subsequent choice is causally deterministic, but 
there is nevertheless a lack of causal determination along the sequence that 
issues in the decision (and action). And I shall point out that this approach 
also seems to lead to the view that an agent can be morally responsible for 
making a choice even though he could not have (at any relevant time) made 
a different choice. 
I do not have the space here to layout this second family of libertarian 
accounts fully or carefully. But I shall simply sketch the main ideas and hope 
that enough of the content of the approach will emerge to convince the reader 
that this family of views constitutes a minimally plausible, seriou·s libertarian 
approach-worth further elaboration and evaluation in the context of the 
issues under discussion here. In his article, "On Giving Libertarians What 
They Say They Want," Daniel Dennett has presented this family of ap-
proaches; he does not necessarily endorse the view, but presents it as the most 
plausible and appealing version of libertarianism. 
What is crucial to Dennett's view is that indeterminacy be installed at the 
appropriate place, and Dennett argues that this is not between the judgment 
that a particular act is the best among one's alternatives and the subsequent 
choice. He says, "Clearly, what the libertarian has in mind is indeterminism at 
some earlier point, prior to the ultimate decision or formation of intention .... ,,8 
Rather, Dennett argues that there can be lack of causal determinism (of a certain 
sort) within the process of deliberation that leads to the agent's judgment as to 
what is the best option (under the circumstances). He attributes the following 
thought to the poet, Paul Valery, and claims that it nicely captures the basic idea 
of the approach he is suggesting on behalf of the libertarian: 
It takes two to invent anything. The one makes up combinations; the other 
one chooses, recognizes what he wishes and what is important to him in the 
mass of the things which the former has imparted to him. What we call genius 
is much less the work of the first one than the readiness of the second one 
to grasp the value of what has been laid before him and to choose it. 9 
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Dennett goes on to say: 
When someone is faced with an important decision, something in him gen-
erates a variety of more or less relevant considerations bearing on the deci-
sion. Some of these considerations, we may suppose, are determined to be 
generated, but others may be non-deterministically generated .... Those con-
siderations that are selected by the agent as having a more than negligible 
bearing on the decision then figure in a reasoning process, and if the agent 
is in the main reasonable, those considerations ultimately serve as predictors 
and explicators of the agent's final decision. 10 
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So Dennett's picture suggested on behalf of the libertarian involves some lack 
of causal determination in the process of deliberation, but no such lack in the 
link between the judgment as to what is best and the formation of an intention 
(or the making of a decision). Let me emphasize that I am not in a position 
here fully to layout this view (or set of views) or to defend it. Dennett argues 
that it is the only sort of libertarianism that is plausible, and I believe that it 
is at least minimally plausible. I also believe that it is libertarianism. Note 
that Widerker only considers those forms of libertarianism according to which 
no state of the world (including the judgment as to what is best) prior to the 
decision causally determines the decision. But this unduly restricts the options 
open to the libertarian, and it was not the understanding of libertarianism with 
which I operated in "Responsibility and Control"; there I spoke more broadly of 
a lack of determination in the actual sequence issuing in the decision and action: 
... nothing about Frankfurt's example requires the actual sequence issuing in 
the decision and action to proceed in a deterministic way; if it proceeds in a 
non-deterministic way that satisfies the libertarian, then Jones can be held 
responsible, even though he could not have done otherwise. ll 
Now if roughly the sort of libertarianism suggested by Dennett is correct, 
then we can take the prior sign to be the agent's judgment about what is best 
to do. By hypothesis this sign is deterministically related to the subsequent 
decision. Given the approach suggested by Dennett, the example of Jones and 
Black can be developed as follows. Prior to T, Jones engages in deliberation; 
some aspects of this deliberation-perhaps the precise considerations that 
emerge or the precise order of Jones' reflections-are not causally determi-
nistic. At T Jones comes to judge that voting for Reagan is best. On the basis 
of this judgment, at T +i Jones decides to vote for Reagan. Given the liber-
tarian view of the fixity of the past, Jones cannot at T +i refrain from deciding 
to vote for Reagan. And yet the actual sequence that issued in his decision 
was not causally deterministic. Further, given the presence of Black and his 
ability to intervene should Jones form the judgment at T that voting for Carter 
would be best, it is true in the example that Jones at no relevant time has the 
ability to decide to vote for Carter (or anyone else). And yet- he may be 
deemed by the libertarian morally responsible for voting for Reagan. 
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But perhaps Widerker would here object that I have simply pushed the 
debate back to the issue of whether the relevant agent can make a different 
judgment as to what is best (and how this ability relates to moral responsi-
bility). And I agree that in a full discussion of the relevance of alternative 
possibilities to moral responsibility one would need carefully to consider 
these matters. 12 Let me say a few brief words here. 
There obviously are cases (perhaps different from the JoneslBlack case) in 
which it is absolutely clear what one should do-cases in which there are 
extremely strong reasons to do something and no good reasons not to. For 
example, a baby has fallen into a swimming pool in front of you and is in 
immediate danger of drowning. All you have to do is bend over and pick the 
baby up; this would be extremely easy for you, and we may suppose that 
there are no other morally relevant reasons. On the picture suggested by 
Dennett and given the presence of a counterfactual intervener such as Black, 
if you decide to save the baby, you may well be morally responsible for this 
decision even though you could not have made a different decision. And this 
is compatible with lack of causal determination in the sequence leading to the 
decision: the precise ordering of considerations in the (admittedly brief) delib-
erations that preceded your decision may have been indeterministic. (Thus far, 
the analysis implies that things are the same as in the JoneslBlack case.) 
Now is it plausible here to say that it is in virtue of the fact that you could 
have formed a different judgment as to what is best that you are morally 
responsible for your decision? That is, does the existence of this alternative 
possibility ground your moral responsibility for your decision? I do not deny 
that the alternative possibility exists, but I do very much doubt that it is what 
grounds your moral responsibility. For what would such an alternative pos-
sibility be like? It would be the possibility to judge best something for which 
there are no good reasons-failing to bend over and save the baby. And it 
does not seem to me plausible to say that this kind of possibility is what 
grounds your moral responsibility for your decision. 13 Thus, I believe that 
this case is plausibly construed as a case in which the actual sequence exhibits 
the lack of causal determination, the agent does not have the ability to make 
a different decision, and the agent is morally responsible for making his 
decision; further, the ascription of moral responsibility is not based on the 
existence of any alternative possibility. 
University of California, Riverside 
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cases because they are (for various reasons) insufficiently robust. 1 would make a similar 
kind of argument with regard to the judgment of what is best in the case discussed in the 
text. The proper analysis of this sort of case melds considerations presented in Fischer, 
1994 and those developed in Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). Wolf presents cases in which an agent performs a good act and 
in which it is implausible to suppose that his or her moral responsibility depends on the 
possibility of his behaving badly; my point here is related but slightly different. My point 
is that it is implausible to suppose that one's moral responsibility is grounded on the 
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